

Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 207423 TOSEC 100344

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFOR, EAID, PO, AE, ' SREF

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: EVACUATION OF ANGOLA REFUGEES
TO PORTUGAL (S/S NO. 7517200)

FROM INGERSOLL TO THE SECRETARY

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MEMORANDUM IS TO OBTAIN YOUR
GUIDANCE ON A REPLY TO COSTA GOMES' REQUEST THAT WE HELP
IN THE EVACUATION OF PORTUGUESE CITIZENS (ALMOST ALL WHITE)
FROM ANGOLA TO PORTUGAL. THERE ARE TWO QUESTIONS: (1)
WHETHER TO DO IT AND, IF SO, (2) HOW TO DO IT AND AT WHAT
LEVEL.

2. SITREP: COSTA GOMES' LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT WAS
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DELIVERED AUGUST 27. IT ASKS US FOR SUPPORT IN THE HUMANI-
TARIAN TASK OF EVACUATING PORTUGUESE CITIZENS FROM ANGOLA
TO PORTUGAL. IN THE AUGUST 29 "CHANGE" GONCALVES STAYS ON
AS CHIEF OF STAFF. NEW PM AZEVEDO IS WEAK, AND PROBABLY

NOT ACCEPTABLE TO MODERATES, WHOSE MOODS FLUTTER FROM OPTIMISM TO GLOOM TO DETERMINATION. BOTH SIDES HAVE DONE SOME MUSCLE-FLEXING, THE LEFT BY A LARGE DEMONSTRATION IN LISBON, THE MODERATES BY (A) SENDING COPCON TROOPS TO RAID THE AGIT-PROP BRANCH OF THE ARMY (VERY LEFT), (B) STAGING A BIG DEMONSTRATION IN OPORTO AND (C) BY OTHER ADMONITIONS TO COSTA GOMES. IN WASHINGTON THERE IS INCREASING PRESS QUESTIONING ON OUR RESPONSE TO THE PORTUGUESE APPEAL, INCLUDING WHETHER OR NOT WE ARE STALLING.

3. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS:

A. CARLUCCI WAS AUTHORIZED TO TELL COSTA GOMES WE WERE PREPARED TO ASSIST IN ANGOLAN EVACUATION BY WHATEVER MEANS WERE MOST EFFICIENT. HE MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO WORK WITH GONCALVES. WE WANTED A GOVERNMENT WE COULD WORK WITH. OUR PRESS LINE IS THAT OUR RESPONSE WAS POSITIVE IN PRINCIPLE, THAT WE ARE EXAMINING ATTENDANT PROBLEMS OF LOGISTICS AND FUNDING, THAT OUR AID WOULD BE HUMANITARIAN AND NON-POLITICAL, AND THAT ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN EXPEDITIOUSLY.

B. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS "CHANGED", GONCALVES REMAINS. STILL, COSTA GOMES HAS SAID THAT ON RELIEF MATTERS WE ARE TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH HIS OFFICE AND THAT GONCALVES WILL NOT BE INVOLVED IN THE MATTER.

C. THE ANGOLAN SITUATION REMAINS DRAMATIC AND TRAGIC, BUT IS NOT YET BLOODY AS FAR AS THE PORTUGUESE REFUGEES ARE CONCERNED. PRESS COVERAGE OF ANGOLAN FIGHTING AND PORTUGUESE REFUGEES CONTINUES TO BE SUBSTANTIAL.

D. THE 135,000-PLUS ANGOLAN REFUGEES ALREADY IN PORTUGAL HAVE BEEN AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE DEMANDED GONCALVES' OUSTER MOST STRONGLY AND OPENLY. REPATRIATES WILL PROBABLY BE STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST.

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E. IN ADDITION TO THE U.S., COSTA GOMES ALSO TURNED TO THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND RUSSIANS FOR HELP. THE BRITISH HAVE OFFERED A VC-10; AND THE FRENCH ARE MAKING THREE 707 FLIGHTS PER WEEK. PARIS TELLS US THIS WILL BE INCREASED SHORTLY AND THEN TERMINATE. THUS FAR THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT REPLIED. THEORETICALLY THEY COULD EXPLOIT ANY LACK OF U.S. RESPONSIVENESS BY MOUNTING THEIR OWN MASSIVE AIR EVACUATION, BUT THEIR AIRLIFT TRACK RECORD IS SO POOR WE DOUBT THAT THEY WILL TRY THIS DEVICE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY CAN BE POWERFUL AND RELIABLE FRIENDS OF PORTUGAL, GONCALVES AND THE PCP.

F. CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST ALREADY IS MANIFEST (OFFICES OF SENATORS KENNEDY AND STEVENSON, CONGRESSMAN DIGGS -- ALSO WITH A PAST HISTORY OF INTEREST ARE SENATORS BROOKE, CLARK AND INOUE AND REPRESENTATIVES CONTE, FASCELL AND MORGAN). IN ADDITION TO CRITICIZING ANY POLITICAL CONDITIONS TIED TO HUMANITARIAN AID, DIGGS WANTS TO ENSURE THAT ANY HELP FOR EVACUEES (ALMOST ALL ARE WHITE) IS BALANCED BY REASONABLE AID FOR BLACKS IN ANGOLA DISPLACED BY FIGHTING.

G. CARLUCCI REPORTS THAT IF WE DO NOT INITIATE OUR AIRLIFT QUICKLY, WE WILL MAKE INCREASINGLY CREDIBLE THE COMMUNIST CHARGES IN PORTUGAL, S PRESS THAT WE ARE BLACKMAILING COSTA GOMES ON THE AIRLIFT BECAUSE MELO ANTUNES IS OUR MAN. SUCH CHARGES COULD HURT US, AND MELO ANTUNES.

4. SCALE OF THE PROBLEM:

A. THE GOP ASKED ON AUGUST 28 THAT WE PROVIDE TWO 747S AND FOUR 707S FOR THE FIRST THREE WEEKS, AND UP TO TWICE THAT NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AFTER THAT. IF WE AIRLIFT THE NUMBER OF PASSENGERS THE GOP REQUEST COVERS, THE FIRST THREE WEEKS WOULD COST ABOUT \$5 MILLION AND THE SECOND THREE WEEKS ANOTHER \$10 MILLION -- \$15 MILLION IN ALL FOR A SIX WEEK EFFORT THAT WOULD EVACUATE ABOUT 50,000 OF THE 200,000 POTENTIAL
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EVACUEES MENTIONED BY THE PORTUGUESE IN THEIR INITIAL AUGUST 23 INFORMAL REQUEST FOR HELP. TOTAL POTENTIAL EVACUEES ARE 300,000 OF WHICH 100,000 ARE BEING TAKEN OUT BY THE PORTUGUESE AIRLINE, TAP.

B. A QUESTION WE NEED NOT FACE NOW, BUT WHICH WE SHOULD ANTICIPATE, IS A POSSIBLE DEMAND FOR DRAMATICALLY EXPANDED ASSISTANCE IN THE LAST WEEKS BEFORE NOVEMBER 11. (ONCE ANGOLA IS INDEPENDENT, THE NEW GOVERNMENT MAY WANT TO RESTRICT THE EXODUS OF TRAINED TECHNICAL PERSONNEL). THE ADDED COSTS COULD REACH \$45 MILLION, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO GET SPECIAL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION BEFORE WE COULD RESPOND -- IF WE WANTED TO. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT RECENTLY ASKED US TO HELP WITH THE 14,000 ANGOLA REFUGEES WHO HAVE ALREADY FLED TO NAMIBIA. (ANGOLAN LIBERATION GROUPS HAVE HALTED THE FLOW SINCE LAST WEEK). WE TOLD THE SAG WE COULD NOT RPT NOT HELP BECAUSE WE MUST FIRST ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF POTENTIAL REFUGEES STILL IN ANGOLA.

C. SUBSTANTIAL FUNDS IN ADDITION TO THOSE NEEDED FOR REFUGEE EVACUATION EVENTUALLY WILL BE NEEDED FOR THE

INTERNATIONAL RELIEF PROGRAM FOR THOSE REMAINING IN ANGOLA. ICRC NOW HAS A SMALL OPERATION UNDERWAY WHICH WE HAVE CONTRIBUTED \$200,000. BUT WHEN POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONDITIONS WITHIN ANGOLA PERMIT, PROGRAMS TO RESETTLE REFUGEES RETURNING FROM ZAIRE, RESTORE SERVICES AND SO ON WILL PROBABLY FORCE US TO SEEK ADDITIONAL FUNDING.

5. OPTIONS

A. DELAY RESPONDING FOR A FEW MORE DAYS.

THIS ALLOWS MORE TIME FOR THE DUST TO SETTLE AND DOES NOT RELAX ANY OF THE PRESSURES ON COSTA GOMES. THE DISADVANTAGES ARE THAT THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT THE SITUATION IN PORTUGAL WILL CLARIFY IN WAYS THAT EASE OUR DECISION. WE ALSO INCREASE THE DANGER OF HARMING THE MELO ANTUNES GROUP DURING THE DELAY BY APPEARING TO LINK HUMANITARIAN AID
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WITH PORTUGUESE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS.

B. LIMITED AIRLIFT NOW, POSSIBLE INCREASE LATER.

THIS OPTION WOULD HAVE US OFFER ONE OR TWO PLANES DAILY FOR A WEEK OR SO (DAILY EVACUATION OF 150-300 PERSONS). WE WOULD TELL COSTA GOMES CONTINUATION OR

EXPANSION OF OUR EFFORT WOULD DEPEND ON THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN PORTUGAL AND ON PORTUGUESE ACTIONS IN ANGOLA, ESPECIALLY VIS-A-VIS THE MPLA.

THE OPTION WOULD MARK OUR CONCERN FOR THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS, PERHAPS ASSUAGE ANTICIPATED CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC CRITICISM IN THIS REGARD, YET KEEP CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON COSTA GOMES. IT ALSO WOULD GIVE TIME TO CONSULT CONGRESS IN ADVANCE REGARDING ANY LARGER-SCALE EFFORT.

DISADVANTAGES ARE THAT IT WOULD NOT COMPLETELY DISARM THE BLACKMAIL CHARGES, SINCE THE SIZE OF THE PORTUGUESE REQUEST WILL QUICKLY BE WELL KNOWN; PRESSURE ON COSTA GOMES MIGHT DECLINE TO ABOUT THE SAME EXTENT THE BLACKMAIL CHARGES LOSE CREDIBILITY; AND A SUBSEQUENT DECISION TO ELIMINATE THE SUPPORT ALTOGETHER (IF GONCALVES REMAINS POWERFUL) WOULD BE LIKELY TO DRAW STRONG CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC CRITICISM AND PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF GONCALVES AND THE PCP.

HYLAND DOES NOT OPPOSE DEFERRING DECISION (OPTION A), BUT BELIEVES THAT OPTION B HAS ADVANTAGES AS FOLLOW. LARGE SCALE AIRLIFT, WHETHER U.S. NATIONAL EFFORT OR

MULTILATERAL ONE, WILL BEGIN TO RELIEVE CERTAIN PRESSURES ON GONCALVES AND COSTA GOMES. WILLINGNESS OF U.S. TO GO VERY FAR IN THIS DIRECTION AT THIS TIME MAY WELL HELP GONCALVES MAINTAIN HIS REGIME. MOREOVER, AS REFUGEE PROBLEM IS EASED IN ANGOLA, THEN PORTUGUESE WILL FIND IT EASIER SIMPLY TO WALK AWAY IN NOVEMBER,

LEAVING MPLA IN PROBABLE CONTROL OF LUANDA, WITH A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM TO BEING THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF
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ANGOLA. THUS, HYLAND URGES OUR ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE TIED CLOSELY TO POLITICAL OBJECTIVES BOTH IN LISBON AND ANGOLA, RATHER THAN DICTATED BY PURE HUMANITARIAN REASONS OR FEAR OF CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM. EVEN IF THE ANTUNES GROUP COMES TO POWER, WE NEED TO CLARIFY PORTUGUESE INTENTIONS IN ANGOLA. A LIMITED EFFORT NOW GIVES US SOME LEVERAGE OVER THE SITUATION AND A POSSIBLE INCENTIVE FOR COSTA GOMES, WHILE MEETING CRITICISMS OF TOTAL INACTION.

C. SAY WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND ONLY TO AN ICEM INTERNATIONAL APPEAL.

ONLY ICEM (INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN MIGRATION) IS WILLING TO HELP WITH AN AIRLIFT. THE ICRC DOES NOT DO EVACUATIONS AND THE UNHCR HAS ALREADY TURNED DOWN A PORTUGUESE REQUEST. THE OFFER COULD BE LINKED WITH AN INDICATION THAT WE COULD BEGIN BILATERAL OPERATIONS BEFORE AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT GETS UNDER WAY IN THE EVENT OF A FAVORABLE POLITICAL TURN IN LISBON. AND ICEM EFFORT WOULD TAKE AT LEAST ONE OR TWO WEEKS TO START, PERHAPS MORE. WE WOULD HAVE A POSTURE OF RESPONDING TO HUMANITARIAN NEED THROUGH AN ORGANIZATION THE CONGRESS LIKES, WITHOUT FORMALLY RELATING OUR ACTION TO POLITICAL CONDITIONS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WE WOULD STILL BE COMMITTED TO HELPING ONCE ICEM WAS IN THE ACT, EVEN IF THERE WERE NO IMPROVEMENT IN POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN LISBON OR IN PORTUGUESE ACTIONS REGARDING MPLA. AND THE DELAY IN DELIVERING HELP PLUS THE POLITICAL CONDITION ON POSSIBLE BILATERAL HELP (LIKELY TO BE LEAKED IN LISBON) COULD BUTTRESS THE BLACKMAIL CHARGES.

THE IDEA OF USING ICEM RAISES OTHER PROBLEMS DISCUSSED IN SECTION "7-A" BELOW. AID PROPOSES THIS OPTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO OPTION D IF OPTION D IS NOT CHOSEN. AF CONCURS. HYLAND OPPOSES.

D. START AIRLIFT IMMEDIATELY AT THE LEVEL REQUESTED BY THE GOP.

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THIS ACTION WOULD BE CONSONANT WITH ANTICIPATED CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC PRESSURE IN FAVOR OF A QUICK AND SUBSTANTIAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE DRAMATIC ANGOLAN SITUATION. MOREOVER, OUR OWN PUBLIC AND THE EUROPEANS ARE LIKELY TO BECOME CRITICAL OF OUR POSITION IF IT APPEARS WE ARE TRYING TO ATTACH POLITICAL CONDITIONS TO OUR RESPONSE TO A HUMAN CRISIS. SUPPORT NOW WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO COSTA GOMES, A RESPONSE APPLAUDED BY RELIABLE "MODERATE" SPOKESMEN. COSTA GOMES MADE HIS REQUEST STRICTLY ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, AS WE IMPLIED WOULD BE NECESSARY, AND HE ORGANIZED HIS EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE TO WORK WITH GONCALVES.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE NO PROMISES FROM THE GOP REGARDING FUTURE ATTITUDES TOWARD MPLA, WE WOULD IN ANY EVENT CONTRIBUTE TO INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORTS IN ANGOLA SOON AFTERWARD IN ORDER TO AVOID IMPLICATIONS OF RACISM IN OUR ACTION, AND CONCEIVABLY COSTA GOMES COULD READ THIS RESPONSE AS A PARTIAL RELAXATION OF OUR PRESSURES TO DUMP GONCALVES.

THIS OPTION WOULD REQUIRE IMMEDIATE CONSULTATION WITH INTERESTED CONGRESSMEN (SENATORS KENNEDY, BROOKE, INOUE, HUMPHREY, CASE, CONGRESSMEN DIGGS, CONTE, MORGAN AND PASSMAN) MOST OF WHOM WILL NOT RETURN TO WASHINGTON UNTIL AFTER LABOR DAY. CARLUCCI FAVORS THIS OPTION AS DO THE ANTUNES "MODERATES" WITH WHOM HE IS IN CONTACT.

E. REFUSE TO HELP UNTIL GONCALVES IS OUT AND A NEW PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTABLE TO US IS INSTALLED.

THIS WOULD BE THE STRONGEST ACTION IN TERMS OF PRESSURES ON COSTA GOMES AND IF THERE WERE A NEW GOVERNMENT IT WOULD BE THE PRIME BENEFICIARY. THE UNABASHED U.S. POLITICAL CONDITIONS WOULD BOOMERANG AGAINST THE MODERATES AND STRENGTHEN GONCALVES. WE WOULD FACE DISAPPROVAL FROM THE EUROPEANS AND OUR OWN PUBLIC. WE WOULD APPEAR TO BE RENEGING ON OUR PREVIOUS WILLINGNESS TO HELP AND THE COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED PORTUGUESE

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MEDIA WOULD HAVE A FIELD DAY.

THIS OPTION ALSO WOULD REQUIRE MODIFICATION OF OUR PRESS GUIDANCE TO EXPLAIN AND JUSTIFY THE DELAY.

6. ANY OF THESE OPTIONS HAS IMPLICATIONS, AS WE HAVE

NOTED, FOR OUR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, FUNDING AND PUBLIC POSTURE.

A. CONGRESS.

WE WILL NEED SUPPORT OF KEY FIGURES, SUCH AS KENNEDY, MORGAN, MCGEE, BROOKE, HUMPHREY, INOUE AND PASSMAN FOR ANY AID PROPOSALS WE MAY WANT TO MAKE. SUCH KEY FIGURES ARE LIKELY TO BE HOSTILE IF WE ANNOUNCE AN AID EFFORT

WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION. FURTHER, OUR AID FUNDING IS LIMITED TO \$5 MILLION UNTIL AT LEAST TWO WEEKS AFTER OUR INITIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS.

ONCE WE HAVE DECIDED HOW WE WANT TO RESPOND TO COSTA GOMES REQUEST, THEN WE WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH INTERESTED CONGRESSMEN TO ASSURE CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT.

B. FUNDING.

A \$15-\$19 MILLION EFFORT WOULD COVER THE GOP'S ENTIRE AIRLIFT REQUEST TO US, IS WITHIN AVAILABILITIES, AND REPRESENTS A RESPECTABLE BUT NOT EXCESSIVE 25 PERCENT OF ESTIMATED COSTS IF ALL OF THE 200,000 NEEDING ASSISTANCE WERE EVACUATED. ALL AGENCIES AGREE THE MONEY SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM DISASTER RELIEF FUNDS FOR REFUGEES. THE ALTERNATIVE WAS SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE WHICH CANNOT BE MIXED WITH DISASTER RELIEF MONEYS, WHICH MAY BE NEEDED LATER FOR A MAJOR PROGRAM IN PORTUGAL IF POLITICAL EVENTS JUSTIFY IT, AND WHICH CANNOT BE MADE AVAILABLE IN LESS THAN TWO TO THREE WEEKS.

ORM'S CURRENT AUTHORITY OF 10 MILLION DOLLARS IS SURE TO BE RAISED TO 25 MILLION DOLLARS IN THE STATE
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DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION PROCESS. THE STATE APPROPRIATION BILL PROVIDES A CONVENIENT VEHICLE FOR APPROPRIATING AS MUCH MONEY FOR REFUGEES AS THE CONGRESS WOULD AGREE TO. THE APPROPRIATIONS BILL IS SCHEDULED TO COME BEFORE THE SENATE NEXT WEDNESDAY. THIS WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE YOUR DIRECT REQUEST TO PASTORE. THE APPEAL COULD BE FOR REFUGEES IN GENERAL AND WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE TIED TO THE ANGOLAN REFUGEES.

C. PRESS GUIDANCE.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE CURRENT LINE, (PARA 3A) PENDING YOUR DECISION ON THE BASIC OPTIONS, AFTER WHICH WE WILL DEVELOP NEW GUIDANCE APPROPRIATE

TO THE OPTION YOU CHOOSE.

7. THERE ARE SEVERAL QUESTIONS ON MODALITIES ON WHICH WE NEED YOUR GUIDANCE NOW, EVEN IF YOU CHOOSE OPTION "E" (REJECTION OF AIRLIFT SUPPORT FOR THE TIME BEING), SINCE EVEN IN THAT CASE THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT A SUDDEN TURN OF EVENTS IN LISBON MIGHT JUSTIFY IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF A U.S. AIRLIFT. THE QUESTIONS:

A. SHOULD WE DIRECT OUR ASSISTANCE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE ICEM (INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION), OR SHOULD WE DELIVER IT DIRECTLY AND BILATERALLY?

1. THE ICEM

THE ICEM IS A WHOLLY WESTERN ORGANIZATION, HAS 31 MEMBERS. NEITHER THE SOVIETS NOR ANY EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRY BELONGS OR HAS EVER CONTRIBUTED TO ITS WORK, NOR HAS THE ICEM SOLICITED EAST EUROPEAN OR SOVIET HELP.

PROS:

-- IT HAS THE ORGANIZATION AND KNOW-HOW AND CAN
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MOVE AS QUICKLY AS ANY OTHER METHOD.

-- IT CAN APPEAL TO 31 OTHER POTENTIAL DONORS, ESPECIALLY EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF ICEM NOT ALREADY APPROACHED BY THE GOP.

-- IT WOULD EMPHASIZE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS AND SHIELD THE U.S. FROM ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICAL MOTIVATION OR RACISM.

-- IT CAN ORGANIZE A SEA-LIFT IF THAT BECOMES DESIRABLE.

-- CONGRESS APPROVES OF USING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GENERAL AND WOULD ENCOURAGE USING THE ICEM IN THIS INSTANCE.

-- U.S. VISIBILITY CAN BE ASSURED, AS AMBASSADOR CARLUCCI RECOMMENDS, BY USE OF U.S. FLAG AIRCRAFT, OR EVEN U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

-- IT WILL BE EASIER FOR ICEM TO ASSURE PERMISSION TO OVERFLY WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES THAT CURRENTLY DENY SUCH RIGHTS TO THE USG, INCLUDING MAC

CHARTERS.

CONS:

-- U.S. WOULD HAVE LESS CONTROL OF SOME ASPECTS
OF OVERALL AID OPERATION.

-- THE ICEM NEED TO RAISE FUNDS FROM MEMBER
NATIONS COULD CONCEIVABLY DELAY FULL IMPLEMENTATION
OF AN AID EFFORT.

-- A SOVIET OFFER TO CONTRIBUTE THROUGH ICEM
(IT WOULD BE UNPRECEDENTED, THOUGH IS CONCEIVABLE
AS A DEVICE TO AVOID BILATERAL INVOLVEMENT WITH
PORTUGAL) COULD BE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE.

-- PORTUGAL IS NOT A MEMBER OF ICEM (MEMBERSHIP
IS PENDING). WE WOULD HAVE TO GENERATE A
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PORTUGUESE REQUEST TO ICEM FOR ASSISTANCE AND
THE 9-NATION ICEM EXECUTIVE BOARD WOULD NEED TO
APPROVE THE PORTUGUESE REQUEST. ALTHOUGH BOARD
APPROVAL OF SUCH A REQUEST IS ASSURED IN PRINCIPLE,
TIME (PERHAPS A WEEK) COULD BE LOST.

2. DIRECT BILATERAL ASSISTANCE.

PROS:

-- DIRECT ASSISTANCE COULD ENSURE THAT OUR
EFFORT IS MADE HIGHLY VISIBLE, BOTH TO THE
PORTUGUESE AND TO THE REST OF THE WORLD.

-- IT COULD HAVE A HIGH POLITICAL IMPACT.

-- MAC COULD ARRANGE FOR SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION
IF DECISION TO PROVIDE EVACUATION AID IS MADE.

CONS:

-- DIRECT ASSISTANCE COULD OPEN THE U.S. TO
CHARGES OF RACISM (ALMOST ALL EVACUEES ARE WHITE)
PARTICULARLY IF ASSISTANCE IS NOT PROVIDED TO
OTHER REFUGEES IN ANGOLA, WHITE AND BLACK.

-- USE OF U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND ATTENDANT
GROUND SUPPORT COULD INSPIRE CONGRESSIONAL
CRITICISM TO THE EFFECT THAT U.S. IS BEING
DRAWN DIRECTLY INTO VIET-LIKE EXPLOSIVE
POLITICAL SITUATION.

-- DIRECT EFFECT, PARTICULARLY IF ACCOMPLISHED

IN USAF INSIGNIA CRAFT COULD LEAD TO CHARGES
OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN DIVIDED ANGOLAN AND
PORTUGUESE POLITICAL/MILITARY SITUATION.

HYLAND OPPOSES USING ICEM AND PREFERS A DIRECT U.S.
PROGRAM (PROS AND CONS IN NEXT PARA) IN COOPERATION
WITH SIMILAR EFFORTS BY OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. HE
SUGGESTS INCREASING INVOLVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
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ORGANIZATIONS COULD LEAD TO PRESSURES FOR AN

"INTERNATIONAL" SOLUTION OF THE ANGOLAN SITUATION,
AND PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR SOVIET AIRLIFT.

AID, H, AF, AND NSC STAFF (CLIFT) PREFER THAT
WE BE WILLING TO USE ICEM IF THE PORTUGUESE TURN
TO IT. THE ICRC ALREADY IS IN ANGOLA. THE GOP HAS
ALREADY INVITED THE UN AND ITS AGENCIES AND IT
PROBABLY IS ONLY A QUESTION OF TIME IN ANY CASE
BEFORE "INTERNATIONAL" EFFORTS BEGIN. MOREOVER,
THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE BEEN INVITED, THOUGH
CONCEIVABLY WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET A NEW GOP TO
RESCIND ITS INVITATION.

B. SHOULD WE USE U.S. CHARTERED CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT
TO MILITARY AIRCRAFT, OR BOTH? (THE MILITARY
AIRLIFT COMMAND -- MAC -- WOULD MAKE THE
ARRANGEMENTS IN EITHER CASE).

MILITARY AIRCRAFT COULD BE DEPLOYED MORE EASILY
IN A COMBAT SITUATION. THEY ALSO HAVE THE HIGHEST
VISIBILITY AND POLITICAL IMPACT--A CONSIDERATION
WHICH CAN CUT BOTH WAYS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, USE OF U.S. MILITARY
PERSONNEL WOULD RAISE SECURITY AND POLITICAL
PROBLEMS FOR US IN ANGOLA (PARTICULARLY IN MPLA-
CONTROLLED LUANDA), THEIR PRESENCE COULD POSE THE
ISSUE OF POSSIBLE BIG-POWER CONFRONTATION IN ANGOLA,
THE MILITARY AIRCRAFT HAVE A HIGHER COST PER PASSENGER
BECAUSE OF CONFIGURATION, AND STATE MUST CERTIFY
TO DOD THAT NO U.S. CIVILIAN CHARTER AIRCRAFT ARE
AVAILABLE AND THAT IT IS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST
BEFORE IT CAN AUTHORIZE USE OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT
(TWA HAS ALREADY ASKED AID ABOUT SOME CHARTERS).

THE ARGUMENTS FOR USE OF CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT ARE
ESSENTIALLY THE INVERSE OF THOSE FOR MILITARY
AIRCRAFT; I.E. POSSIBLY marginally SLOWER TO START,
BUT LESS EXPENSIVE, STILL VISIBLE, FEWER SECURITY
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PROBLEMS, NO PROBLEMS WITH CONGRESS UNDER THE WAR POWERS ACT.

DOD, AID, H, EUR AND AF PREFER TO RELY PRIMARILY ON CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT, BUT ARE WILLING TO USE USAF PLANES IF NEED BE. HYLAND STRONGLY PREFERS MILITARY AIRCRAFT. CARLUCCI ALSO LIKES A HIGH-VISIBILITY,

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HIGH-IMPACT PROGRAM WITH AT LEAST INITIAL USE OF USAF PLANES, BUT HE HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS TO START QUICKLY, NOT THE KIND OF AIRCRAFT.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. WHETHER TO GIVE HELP:

DEFER A DECISION ON COSTA GOMES' REQUEST UNTIL THE END OF NEXT WEEK (SEPTEMBER 6) (NO ONE PREFERS).

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, PROVIDE A LIMITED AIRLIFT OF ONLY ONE OR TWO PLANES FOR THE MOMENT, KEEPING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE LATER. (PREFERRED BY INGERSOLL, SONNENFELDT, EAGLEBURGER AND HYLAND; AND EUR IF LAST ALTERNATIVE NOT CHOSEN.)

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, SAY THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND ONLY TO AN INTERNATIONAL (ICEM) APPEAL. (PREFERRED BY AID, D/HA AND AF IF THE NEXT ALTERNATIVE IS NOT CHOSEN).

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

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ALTERNATIVELY, MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO PROVIDE AN AIRLIFT EQUIVALENT TO APPROXIMATELY SIX PLANES AS THE GOP HAS REQUESTED, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING THEM. (STRONGLY PREFERRED BY AMB. CARLUCCI, PREFERRED ALSO BY AID, AF, EUR AND NSC STAFF-CLIFT).

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

B. MODAILITY- USE ICEM OR DIRECT CHANNELS:

START WITH DIRECT NATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND CONTINUE IT,
BUT DIRECT SOME ASSISTANCE THROUGH ICEM IF IT ASSUMES AN
EVACUATION ROLE. (AID, H, D/HA, AF PREFER; DOD CONCURS.)

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, PLAN AN EFFORT THAT IS PRINCIPALLY
DIRECT AND BILATERAL. UNDER THIS ALTERNATIVE, AS
IN THE PREVIOUS ONE, WE WOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE OUR
WESTERN ALLIES TO ASSIST. (INGERSOLL, EAGLEBURGER,
CARLUCCI, HYLAND, SONNENFELDT AND EUR PREFER.)

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

C. MODALITY -- CIVILIAN CHARTERS OR USAF AIRCRAFT:

USE CIVILIAN CHARTER AIRCRAFT PRIMARILY,
SUPPLEMENTED BY USAF PLANES TO THE EXTENT CIVILIAN
AIRCRAFT ARE NOT AVAILABLE OR BECOME EXCESSIVELY
EXPENSIVE (INGERSOLL, EAGLEBURGER, AID, EUR, AF, H AND
DOD PREFER).

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, USE A MIX IN WHICH MILITARY AIRCRAFT
HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL PLACE. (HYLAND, SONNENFELDT,
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CARLUCCI PREFER, ALTHOUGH CARLUCCI WOULD NOT PLACE
THIS ISSUE AHEAD OF BASIC QUESTIONS OF GETTING SOME
KIND OF PLANES FLYING).

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

ALTERNATIVELY, USE ONLY CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT, (AF AND
H PREFER).

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

DRAFTED:EUR/WE:EMROWELL:MS

CLEARANCES:

C - MR. SONNENFELDT; AID - MR. PARKER; NSC - MR. CLIFT;
DOD/DSAA - MR. NELSON; H - MR. PEZZULLO; AF - MR. MCULCAHY;
INR- MR. HYLAND; EUR - MR. LOWENSTEIN; D/HA - MR. CARLIN;
L - MR. MICHEL; COORDINATED WITH OMB BY NSC STAFF.
M - MR. EAGLEBURGER.

INGERSOLL

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC, EMERGENCY EVACUATION, REFUGEES, POLICIES, CAT-C
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 30 AUG 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: RowellE0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE207423
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/WE:EMROWELL:MS
Enclosure: TOSEC 100344
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P850047-2304, N750003-0583
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750898/baaaaafo.tel
Line Count: 660
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 13
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS NODIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: RowellE0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 28 MAY 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28 MAY 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <08 OCT 2003 by RowellE0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PFOR, PREF, EAID, SREF, PO, AO, US
To: SECRETARY FLASH INFO LISBON
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006